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THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE COURTS, AND
“PICKING WINNERS”
Judge Thomas L. Ambro* & Paul J. Safier**
Dean Robert Post’s book—Democracy, Expertise, and Academic
Freedom1—reflects and requires serious thought about our First
Amendment. This Essay addresses just two of the many interesting
assertions Dean Post makes. The first is his claim that the advancement
of knowledge in a democracy springs primarily from the knowledge that
experts gather in discerning good from bad ideas, and that recognizing
this value requires courts to develop criteria for determining which
viewpoints are better in ongoing debates among experts. The second is
Dean Post’s contention that the U.S. Constitution protects an individual
right to academic freedom, which requires enforcing this right against
academic institutions. The concern we have in each instance is with the
role his theory assigns to courts in promoting some “experts” over
others.
I.

EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND THE COURTS

Dean Post focuses much of his book on a contrast between the
universal tolerance of expression traditionally associated with the First
Amendment and the disciplinary practices that experts employ to
produce knowledge. Proper appreciation of this contrast, he argues,
requires revising many of our traditional conceptions of the First
Amendment.
To illustrate this contrast, Dean Post begins his work by noting that
his knowledge of an oak tree in his backyard is simply a trusting of his
senses, while his knowledge of the cancerous effects of cigarette
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
** Associate, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP, and former Law Clerk to Judge Ambro. The
authors retain the copyright in this article and authorize royalty-free reproduction for non-profit
purposes, provided any such reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington
Law Review.
1. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012).
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smoking is based on deference to the conclusions of “experts”2 who
“deployed the full and elaborate apparatus of modern epidemiological
and statistical science.”3 He argues that if the First Amendment protects
the dissemination of knowledge to the public, then its application cannot
be wholly characterized by “the egalitarian tolerance that defines the
marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment.”4 That is
because determining whether an expression is worthy of protection
because it promotes knowledge requires determining whether that
expression actually does so. And this in turn requires that “courts apply
the disciplinary methods by which expert knowledge is defined.”5 Thus,
Dean Post argues, “disciplinary practices that create expert knowledge
[should be] invested with constitutional status.”6 That means that courts
should develop “criteria to determine which disciplinary practices”7 are
best so that they may adequately “distinguish[] good ideas from bad
ones.”8
In a nutshell, while the traditional marketplace-of-ideas model
“requires that the speech of all persons be treated with toleration and
equality”9 so that advancements in knowledge and ideas may occur,10 the
democratic competency model Dean Post develops as a counterpoint
does not demand such treatment.11 Ultimately, he argues as follows:

2. Id. at ix. Dean Post includes within the expert group primarily those who acquire knowledge by
scientific inquiry, though he also includes those who are proficient in a profession such as law. See,
e.g., id. at 47–53.
3. Id. at ix.
4. Id. at xii.
5. Id. at 54.
6. Id. at 96.
7. Id. (emphasis in original).
8. Id. at 34.
9. Id.
10. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail . . . .”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (explaining that
“content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas
or viewpoints from the marketplace’” (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))).
11. See POST, supra note 1, at 34 (contrasting traditional First Amendment doctrine that “requires
that the speech of all persons be treated with toleration and equality,” with the creation of expert
knowledge that “requires that speech be subject to a disciplinary authority that distinguishes good
ideas from bad ones”). Dean Post does not deny that the traditional conception of how the First
Amendment operates captures the bulk of First Amendment doctrine. He simply argues that the
egalitarian approach is particular to the public realm, where democratic legitimacy demands that all
persons have at least “the opportunity to make public opinion responsive to their own subjective,
personal views.” Id. at 27–28. He contends that in the private realm the First Amendment primarily
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insofar as the First Amendment is fundamentally egalitarian in its
application, it is not concerned with the promotion of knowledge; and,
insofar as the First Amendment is concerned with the promotion of
knowledge, it is not necessarily egalitarian in its application.
We have two concerns with this position. First, it seems to rest on an
implausible account of the theory behind the marketplace model, which
is more focused on worries about the harmful effects of state power on
free and open debate than on the criteria by which true knowledge is
identified and produced. Second, Post’s suggestion that courts should
take sides in ongoing factual controversies to promote the First
Amendment value of “democratic competence” neglects an important
aspect of First Amendment jurisprudence: the emphasis on minimizing
the footprint of state regulation of speech.
First, the contrast Dean Post draws between traditional First
Amendment tolerance and the standards by which experts produce
knowledge cannot carry the weight he attributes to it. Contrary to what
he implies,12 there is nothing in the traditional First Amendment faith in
the value of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate13 that requires
any corresponding belief in the particular value—let alone equal value—
of each and every submission to that debate. The concern underlying this
emphasis on robust and uninhibited speech is with the potential systemic
effects on the quality of public debate where the government may
suppress even speech that most listeners confidently view as “valueless.”
As Chief Justice John Roberts recently noted in Snyder v. Phelps,14 the
suppression of speech whose “contribution to public discourse may be
negligible” can nonetheless have the general effect of “stifl[ing] public
debate.”15
Similarly, that private institutions do not produce knowledge by
adhering to norms of content neutrality does not mean that a
governmental norm of content neutrality cannot itself serve the purpose
of advancing knowledge. It has never been part of the marketplace
serves a different value, one based on protecting sources of actual knowledge, not on the equal right
of all to shape public opinion no matter how erroneous or wrongheaded their views. See id. at 34.
12. See id. at 10 (arguing that equal tolerance for all contributions to debate cannot be accounted
for in epistemic terms because “[i]t is not intelligible to believe that all ideas are equal” (emphasis
in original)).
13. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
14. 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
15. Id. at 1220; see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534,
541 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The distaste we may feel as individuals toward the content or message of
protected expression cannot, of course, detain us from discharging our duty as guardians of the
Constitution.”).
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theory to demand that private actors and institutions govern themselves
along the lines of that theory. In fact, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,16 the U.S. Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that a
general commitment to fostering a “marketplace of ideas” justifies
requiring private institutions to open themselves up to opposing
viewpoints.17 The First Amendment protects the right of private actors
and institutions to exclude disfavored speech and to enforce their own
conceptions of orthodoxy.18 In other words, the marketplace of ideas that
the First Amendment protects, properly understood, is made up of actors
and institutions that do not internally operate under a marketplace
model.
What these last two points reduce to is that the First Amendment is
peculiarly concerned with state action. Above all else, the Amendment
expresses a fear of the dangers uniquely associated with government
interference in the development and expression of ideas.19 It specifically
bars “government control over the search for political truth.”20
Accordingly, defending the pervasive First Amendment norm of content
neutrality on the ground that it promotes the growth of knowledge does
not require any sophisticated theory of the nature of knowledge. It only

16. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
17. See id. at 258 (“The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—
whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”).
18. See, e.g., id.; R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 735 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1984)
(“The [F]irst [A]mendment is not ordinarily implicated when private actors design . . . restrictions
on expression; indeed, in many instances the [F]irst [A]mendment has been held to guarantee
private actors the right to make such restrictions.”); see also, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (The First Amendment prohibits state
accommodation law from requiring inclusion of particular group within a parade because it is a
“fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a [private] speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”).
19. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“Premised on
mistrust of government power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints.”); see also Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 897, 918 (2010) (suggesting that the First Amendment “was designed to serve a quite limited
purpose in preventing government suppression, rather than serving as a guarantor of the accuracy
(or quality in general) of public debate”).
20. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980) (emphasis
added); see also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (The First
Amendment guarantees “an open marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may
compete without government interference.” (emphasis added)); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that “the forefathers did not trust any government to
separate the true from the false for us”).
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requires some belief that a society in which government coercion is used
to “pick winners” in public controversies, including factual
controversies, would in the long run be one in which the development of
knowledge did not advance as much as it otherwise would.21 Others can
decide whether that belief is empirically correct, but it is central to the
First Amendment as we understand it.
Second, Dean Post’s suggestions as to how courts should protect
expert knowledge from political intrusion reflect a one-sided account of
First Amendment values. The traditional conception of the First
Amendment is that it mandates that government, including courts,
refrain from “regulat[ing] speech based on its substantive content or the
message it conveys.”22 As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski recently put it,
“[t]he one guiding light of our First Amendment law is that government
officials, and courts in particular, are not allowed to make judgments
about the value of speech.”23 Dean Post rejects this, asserting that to
promote the citizenry’s access to truthful information, courts must
“attribute constitutional status to the disciplinary practices by which
expert knowledge is itself created.”24
Dean Post is, of course, correct that the First Amendment protects,
among other things, the right of audiences to be exposed to valuable
information, especially in the commercial speech context.25 But we have
concerns about how, under his understanding, courts should enforce this
right. An example Dean Post discusses in Chapter Two of his book
highlights these worries. He poses a hypothetical state law prohibiting
“persons from offering fee-for-service advice about a particular

21. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (“The First
Amendment . . . reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on
the Government outweigh the costs.”).
22. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995); see also
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
23. United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 457; see also Dible v.
Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he degree of protection the [F]irst [A]mendment
affords speech does not vary with the social value ascribed to that speech by the courts.” (quoting
Kev, Inc., v. Kitsap Cnty., 793 F.2d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 1986))).
24. POST, supra note 1, at 55.
25. See id. at 38–43; see also, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559
U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (“First Amendment protection for commercial speech is
justified in large part by the information’s value to consumers . . . .”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (“It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.”).

06 -- Ambro FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

402

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/4/2012 9:10 PM

[Vol. 87:397

homeopathic medical remedy.”26 A court confronted with a challenge to
this prohibition “must determine whether First Amendment coverage is
triggered by deciding whether prohibiting advice about the remedy does
or does not suppress the circulation of knowledge. And it must make that
determination by applying the methods of one discipline or another.”27
But it is not clear how a court should do this. How does it choose which
expert in homeopathic medicine to treat as authoritative?28 Why should a
court defer to an expert in homeopathic medicine at all, rather than an
expert in traditional medicine, who might be skeptical of the whole
enterprise? Most importantly, what if the state of expert knowledge on
this subject changes, such that a homeopathic remedy that was thought
by many experts to be bogus turns out to be highly beneficial? In that
case, does the constitutional status of the prohibition change as well? Or
does a court’s prior judgment become constitutionally entrenched?
In suggesting that courts aggressively take sides in “expert” disputes
in this fashion, Dean Post underplays a central aspect of First
Amendment doctrine—that even speech that serves no constitutional
value must be under-regulated so as to avoid any possible chilling effect
on protected expression. For instance, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,29 the Court famously observed that “erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate” and that such statements “must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they
need . . . to survive.”30 This is so even though the Court has also held
that there is not necessarily any “constitutional value in false statements
of fact” per se.31 The same spirit animates the “overbreadth doctrine,”
which “prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a
substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the
26. POST, supra note 1, at 56.
27. Id. at 57–58.
28. Dean Post suggests that courts should be comfortable with assessing the reliability of claims
to expertise, as Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence already requires such determinations. See
id. at 8–9. But the reliability test under Rule 702 is not very stringent by design. See, e.g., Pineda v.
Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 702’s requirements are applied
inclusively not to pick the better argument, but to determine who is qualified to testify as an expert).
That courts can—and, where possible, should—admit competing experts who qualify as such does
not appear to be an option under the analysis Dean Post advocates.
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The First Amendment requires
that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”).
31. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never
been protected for its own sake.”).
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process.”32 This concern seems neglected in Dean Post’s theory, which
counsels favoring some disciplinary practices over others.
His response appears to be that the doctrines articulated in Sullivan
and its progeny apply to speech on matters of public concern, whereas
the recommendations he makes primarily concern expression in the
private realm. But this overstates the contrast between how the First
Amendment operates in the two contexts. While Dean Post is correct
that, outside the context of public speech, the First Amendment allows
for a more aggressive policing of the boundaries between truth and
falsity,33 concern for allowing “breathing space” for freedom is
nonetheless still a part of the analysis. Thus, for instance, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that even in the context of regulating fraud,
legal standards must be crafted in a manner that allows “sufficient
breathing room for protected speech.”34 These concerns are present even
in the commercial-speech context, albeit typically with the caveat that
commercial speech is less susceptible to chilling effects than other forms
of speech because it is financially motivated.35
In short, it is a fundamental aspect of the First Amendment that courts
must construct and apply standards that not only correctly decide the
cases before them, but also minimize any harmful effects their decisions
will have on speech and debate outside the courtroom. Underlying this
approach is a kind of intellectual humility that, while perhaps alien to the
production of expert knowledge, is nonetheless central to First
Amendment values. This is the other side of the coin from Dean Post’s
analysis.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the
marketplace generally sorts out ideas better and with more lasting effect
than judges. The job of the latter is clearly cabined, for “the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of
32. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
33. See POST, supra note 1, at 41 (“Because the constitutional value of commercial speech lies in
the information that it carries, the state can engage in content discrimination to regulate and
suppress the circulation of ‘misleading’ information. The contrast to permissible regulation[] of
public discourse is stark. It would be forbidden content discrimination for the state to suppress
‘misleading’ speech within public discourse.”); see also, e.g., Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959
F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (“If truth were a test for censoring noncommercial speech,
the government could ban books that proclaim the earth is flat . . . .”).
34. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003).
35. See, e.g., Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (noting that particular features of commercial
speech “may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the
speaker”); see also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 681 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting from
dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted) (questioning the constitutionality of a state
false-advertising law on the ground that it might “chill” speech).
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truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market.”36 The result may be messy and often exasperating, but it
is how democracies work. Citizens in democratic societies best counter
bad ideas from the ground up rather than with ill-informed judges
making pronouncements from seemingly ex cathedra seats of judgment.
II.

THE REGULATION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

In addition, we have practical worries regarding Dean Post’s
treatment of academic freedom as an object of First Amendment
protection. As he notes, the U.S. Supreme Court on occasion has spoken
of academic freedom as a special First Amendment concern.37 For
example, speaking specifically about research in the social sciences in
his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,38 Justice Felix
Frankfurter declared:
For society’s good—if understanding be an essential need of
society—inquiries into these problems, speculations about them,
stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as
unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from
intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of
wise government and the people’s well-being, except for reasons
that are exigent and obviously compelling.39
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,40 which came out nearly ten years
later, Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority, was even more
explicit in making this connection between the First Amendment and
academic freedom, stating that “[academic] freedom is . . . a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”41
Yet, as Dean Post points out, courts have eschewed developing
special doctrines for protecting academic freedom as a constitutional
ideal.42 For him, “the doctrine of academic freedom stands in a state of
shocking disarray and incoherence.”43 He notes that at least one source
of this lack of doctrinal clarity is a tendency to decide academic freedom
36. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. See POST, supra note 1, at 68–80.
38. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
39. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
41. Id. at 603.
42. POST, supra note 1, at 62.
43. Id.
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cases with reference to the public employee free speech cases like
Pickering v. Board of Education44 and, more recently, Garcetti v.
Ceballos.45 Under that line of cases, the speech of government
employees can only receive First Amendment protection if that speech is
essentially extramural; that is, if it is speech employees make as citizens
rather than as part of their employment.46 Dean Post contends this
framework is inadequate in the academic-freedom context.47 He argues
that there is a distinct First Amendment interest in shielding from
political intrusion the work scholars perform pursuant to their official
duties, as this protects the creation and dissemination of expert
knowledge (or, in Dean Post’s parlance, “democratic competence”).48
On Dean Post’s theory, “First Amendment coverage should be triggered
whenever [scholarship] is inhibited for reasons that do not depend upon
ensuring disciplinary competence as determined by disciplinary
experts.”49
We agree that Garcetti and the public employee speech cases that
preceded it do not account for the special interest in academic freedom
identified in Sweezy and Keyishian.50 Nonetheless, Dean Post’s analysis
44. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
45. 547 U.S. 410 (2006); see POST, supra note 1, at 80–85 (discussing Pickering and Garcetti).
46. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (“[T]he First Amendment does not prohibit managerial
discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”).
47. See POST, supra note 1, at 80–85. The majority in Garcetti expressly declined to answer
whether “expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech
jurisprudence.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
48. See POST, supra note 1, at 72, 77. One of the rationales articulated in Garcetti is that any
public employee’s free-speech rights that were not limited to off-duty speech would interfere with
the government’s interest, as an employer, in controlling what is and is not said on behalf of the
government. See 547 U.S. at 422–23. This emphasis on crafting a unified, official message runs
counter to the pedagogical mission of the university. See POST, supra note 1, at 92 (“Were faculty to
be merely employees of a university, as Garcetti conceptualizes employees, their job would be to
transmit the views of university administrators. Faculty would then no longer expand knowledge,
because they would no longer be responsible for applying independent professional, disciplinary
standards.”); see also Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 991–92 (2009)
(“The job of faculty is to produce and disseminate new knowledge and to encourage critical
thinking, not to indoctrinate students with ideas selected by the government.”). In addition, there is a
problem with even identifying what counts as extramural speech in the context of university faculty,
whose job is in part to engage the broader public as public intellectuals. See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. of
Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 564 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that opinion pieces
published by a criminology professor were not legitimate bases for denying tenure even though they
were submitted as part of his tenure file).
49. POST, supra note 1, at 90.
50. That is not to suggest that the Garcetti framework has no role to play in First Amendment
cases involving public university faculty. Not all aspects of such employment trigger academic
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may underplay the practical difficulties presented by the tension between
academic freedom as an institutional right and as an individual right. As
the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “[w]here . . . government attempts
to direct the content of speech at public educational institutions,
complicated First Amendment issues are presented because government
is simultaneously both speaker and regulator.”51 Dean Post argues that
this tension is illusory because the specific “First Amendment value at
stake in academic freedom”—democratic competence—“encompasses
both the ongoing health of universities as institutions that promote the
growth of disciplinary knowledge and the capacity of individual scholars
to promote and disseminate the results of disciplinary inquiry.”52 The
touchstone, he contends, for all attempts to regulate academic speech—
whether coming from inside or outside the university—is that “a
qualified faculty member cannot be reduced to the mouthpiece of nonprofessional, non-scholarly assessments of relevant knowledge.”53 With
that understanding, “[n]othing in the concept of academic freedom
requires deference to university administrators who possess neither the
capacity nor the pretense of exercising professional judgment.”54
True enough, this last statement applies “when universities make
executive decisions that do not purport to reflect professional
standards.”55 But few cases will actually take that form, or at least do so
in a manner that makes itself evident in the courtroom. An academic
freedom case will rarely be as straightforward as a faculty member, who
does valuable work, being denied tenure for transparently political
reasons. Moreover, given the political disagreements that so often
underlie legitimate academic disputes, it is not clear that even that kind
of case would easily lend itself to judicial resolution. In practice, the
issue often comes with facts set in shades of gray. For example, what
about a case in which a faculty member is denied tenure at a public
university based on a shoddy assessment of her scholarship? Would a
freedom concerns, or at least not academic freedom concerns that potentially implicate the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185–87 (3d Cir. 2009) (Ambro, J.)
(analyzing the allegations of a public university professor that he was terminated based on his
participation in the academic discipline process under the Garcetti framework).
51. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 198 n.6 (1990); see also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731,
736 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Let us not forget that academic freedom includes the authority of the
university to manage an academic community and evaluate teaching and scholarship free from
interference by other units of government, including the courts.”).
52. POST, supra note 1, at 77 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 89.
54. Id. at 79.
55. Id.
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First Amendment claim in that context succeed? While there is no doubt
a strong public interest in allowing unpopular ideas to be tested and
developed in an academic setting, does not a university have the right to
sort out (even, at times, incorrectly) those unpopular academic ideas that
merit protection from those that are simply bad scholarship? Though it
seems unlikely Dean Post necessarily disagrees with that, it is not clear
that he has fully dealt with the practical consequences of that division of
labor.
In at least one case, a court followed the path it appears Dean Post
advocates. In Kerr v. Hurd,56 a federal district court held that the
plaintiff stated a valid First Amendment claim in alleging that the public
medical school in which he taught disciplined him based on his
advocacy of forceps deliveries over Cesarian sections.57 The court held
that “where . . . the expressed views are well within the range of
accepted medical opinion, they should certainly receive First
Amendment protection, particularly at the university level.”58 The
underlying ruling in Kerr may have been appropriate in the context in
which it arose. Nonetheless, we are wary of taking constitutional sides in
academic debates involving knowledge gleaned from scientific inquiry.
That would seem to violate the First Amendment rights of academic
institutions, and do so in a way that could cut off an important source of
intellectual development: namely, the right of academic institutions to
devote themselves exclusively to particular schools of thought.
We suggest that Professor Judith Areen advocates a better approach.59
She argues that where a faculty member challenges a termination or
demotion based on “academic” speech, the university’s decision should
be presumed to be made on legitimate grounds if supported by the
faculty or by a faculty committee.60 If so, the aggrieved scholar can
prevail only by showing that “the decision was ‘such a substantial
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
faculty did not exercise its professional judgment.’”61 As Professor
Areen notes, such an approach would allow courts to “avoid infringing
the academic freedom of academic institutions.”62 In that way, courts
can protect academic freedom in a manner that does not require them to
56. 694 F. Supp. 2d 817 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
57. Id. at 834–35, 843–44.
58. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
59. Areen, supra note 48.
60. Id. at 995.
61. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).
62. Id.

06 -- Ambro FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

408

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/4/2012 9:10 PM

[Vol. 87:397

wade into ongoing academic debates.
CONCLUSION
Dean Post has written a valuable book supporting well the need for
democratic competency as a First Amendment value. The concerns we
express do not displace the core of that measure insofar as it deals with
matters of knowledge attained through scientific inquiry.
Nonetheless, whatever may be true about how expert knowledge is
produced, we are uncomfortable with any suggestion that courts should
jump into the briar patch and “determine which disciplinary practices
implicate the value [of democratic competence] and which do not.”63
That is a bridge far too far. Such an approach raises the specter of the
elite deciding behind closed doors what ideas win and those that lose. As
stated succinctly by Judge Damon Keith, “[d]emocracies die behind
closed doors.”64
We have related concerns about the role Dean Post assigns courts in
protecting academic freedom as a First Amendment value. While we are
sympathetic to his attempt to rescue academic freedom from the more
general public-employee free speech cases, judicial doctrines in this area
must minimize any intrusion by courts on the development and
enforcement of academic standards by universities.

63. POST, supra note 1, at 96 (emphasis added).
64. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).

